Issue 154

Cyber Series Part 2 – Built for Space, Exposed on Earth: Commercialization, COTS & the Space Supply Chain

By Dr. Larissa Beavers For those just joining us please see Part 1 . A satellite may ultimately operate hundreds or thousands of kilometers above Earth, but its cybersecurity story begins much closer to home. Before reaching orbit, a spacec

For those just joining us please see Part 1.

A satellite may ultimately operate hundreds or thousands of kilometers above Earth, but its cybersecurity story begins much closer to home. Before reaching orbit, a spacecraft passes through an extensive ecosystem of manufacturers, suppliers, software developers, integrators, test facilities, launch providers, and network operators. Its processors, memory, sensors, communications equipment, firmware, operating systems, and software may originate from different companies and locations around the world. Increasingly, some of those technologies were not originally designed exclusively for space.

Commercialization has transformed the space industry. Technologies that once required expensive, purpose-built development can increasingly be purchased, adapted, integrated, and launched on much shorter timelines. The U.S. Space Force has embraced that change; Space Systems Command wrote in June 2026 that commercial and dual-use technologies have become essential to maintaining U.S. space capabilities as technology and threats evolve rapidly.

But speed and accessibility introduce a cybersecurity question that extends beyond the satellite itself:

How well do we understand—and trust—everything we put inside it?

From Custom Built to Commercially Available

Historically, many government spacecraft relied heavily on specialized components developed for specific missions and the demanding environment of space. That approach offered substantial control over design and testing, but it was also expensive and slow.

Commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS, technologies offer another option. COTS components, Figure 1 and 2, are commercially available products that can be purchased rather than developed specifically for an individual mission. NASA has used commercial hardware because it can reduce development and certification time, and the agency continues to evaluate COTS electrical, electronic, and electromechanical components for space applications.

The benefits are significant. Commercial technologies can reduce cost, shorten development schedules, provide access to rapidly improving computing capabilities, and allow smaller organizations to develop increasingly sophisticated spacecraft.

Figure 1: NASA JPL Hardware JPL
Figure 2: CubeSat Space Processor NASA

The tradeoff is that the spacecraft developer may no longer control—or even have complete visibility into—every layer of the technology being incorporated. A processor can contain intellectual property developed elsewhere. Software may rely on open-source libraries. Firmware may originate with a supplier. Hardware may pass through distributors and subcontractors before reaching the spacecraft integrator. The spacecraft may be assembled in one clean room, but its digital ancestry can span the globe.

The Supply Chain Becomes Part of the Attack Surface

This is where the issue shifts from acquisition to cybersecurity. NASA defines Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management as identifying, assessing, and mitigating risks associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of technology supply chains. NASA specifically applies those assessments to COTS hardware, software, and cloud services and identifies security, integrity, and resilience of mission-critical systems and components as objectives. The concern is not simply where a component was manufactured. Cyber supply-chain risk can exist throughout a product’s lifecycle:

Design → Software → Components → Manufacturing → Integration → Testing → Updates → Operations

A vulnerability could be unintentionally introduced through poorly secured software. A compromised development environment could affect code before delivery. Counterfeit hardware could enter through an untrusted supplier. Firmware could contain an exploitable vulnerability. An open-source dependency could later be discovered to have a security flaw.

More deliberately, a sophisticated adversary could attempt to compromise a supplier or development environment (Figures 3 and 4) rather than attacking the finished spacecraft directly. That distinction matters. The satellite manufacturer does not have to be compromised if an attacker can compromise something the manufacturer trusts.

NASA highlighted this broader problem in April 2026. The agency noted its increasing reliance on COTS, open-source, vendor-supplied, and partner-developed software increases exposure to supply-chain issues and cited major terrestrial incidents such as SolarWinds and XZ Utils as examples of how weaknesses in software understanding can create systemic risk. Those incidents did not involve satellites. Their relevance to space is the attack model: compromising a trusted component or supplier can provide access farther downstream.

Figure 4: Integrating RMCA ino Mars 2020 rover NASA
Figure 3: Integrated testing on Internal Components of EDSN NASA

Software May Be the Component You Cannot See

A spacecraft component does not need to contain malicious hardware to introduce cyber risk.

Modern satellites depend heavily on software. Flight software processes commands. Firmware controls hardware. Operating systems manage computing resources. Communications software moves information between components. Ground software allows operators to monitor and control spacecraft. That creates an important challenge: A spacecraft can be physically inspected without revealing everything its software will eventually do.

NASA’s current software engineering requirements explicitly require cybersecurity assessments to account for risks associated with COTS, government off-the-shelf, modified off-the-shelf, open-source, and reused software components (Figure 5). The objective is to identify vulnerabilities capable of affecting mission confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

Figure 5: SpaceCube 3.0 Flight Processor Card NASA

This is where commercial technology creates both opportunity and complexity.

NASA’s newer High-Performance Spaceflight Computing architecture (Figure 6) illustrates how capable these systems are becoming. Modern spaceflight processors can support high-speed networking, autonomous processing, multiple sensors, continuous system-health monitoring, and integrated security functions.

More capability, however, means more software—and potentially more code, dependencies, interfaces, and update mechanisms that must be understood and protected.

Figure 6: High Performance Spaceflight Computing System Chip NASA

Trust, but Verify

None of this means commercial technology should be avoided. In fact, that would miss the point. The U.S. government increasingly considers commercial space capabilities essential. A GAO report released in August 2026 notes that DoD already relies on commercial companies for space-derived data and services supporting national security. The challenge is therefore not: COTS or no COTS? It is: How do we use commercial technology while understanding and managing the cyber risk we inherit with it? NASA’s approach to COTS electronics illustrates this distinction. The agency maintains guidance for “Established COTS Parts” from manufacturers that provide sufficient product and company information to support evaluation. Even then, NASA notes that individual programs must determine whether components meet their particular mission, environment, application, and lifetime requirements.

Cybersecurity Cannot Begin at Launch

Space Policy Directive-5 specifically identifies supply-chain management as a component of space-system cybersecurity. It calls for tracking manufactured products, using trusted suppliers, identifying counterfeit, fraudulent, and malicious equipment, and evaluating available risk mitigations. That is an important shift in thinking:

Supply-chain security is not separate from spacecraft cybersecurity. It is one of its earliest layers.

A compromised laptop can be removed from a network. A server can be replaced. Technicians can physically access terrestrial infrastructure.

Most satellites do not offer that luxury.

Space Policy Directive-5 therefore emphasizes that cybersecurity needs to be integrated into spacecraft design before launch, including the capability to update systems and respond to cyber incidents remotely. It calls for cybersecurity throughout the entire space-system lifecycle rather than treating security as something added after development.

Spacecraft integration may occur in a tightly controlled clean room (such as Figure 7), but the hardware and software being assembled can originate from a much broader supplier ecosystem. The clean room therefore represents something interesting from a cyber perspective. Physically, the satellite may be extraordinarily controlled. Personnel wear protective equipment. Components are inspected. Environmental conditions are monitored. Hardware undergoes extensive testing.

Figure 7: NASA’s NEO Surveyor and ASTHROS Clean Room NASA

Summary

But cybersecurity asks a different set of questions, such as: Who wrote the code?; Where did the processor originate?; What libraries are embedded in the software?

There is an important distinction to make. Commercial technology is not inherently less secure than purpose-built technology. COTS components can be thoroughly evaluated, tested, hardened, monitored, and incorporated into secure architectures. Commercial development can also deliver cybersecurity improvements much faster than traditional acquisition processes. The concern is visibility and assurance.

As the number of suppliers, software packages, components, interfaces, and external services grows, understanding exactly what is inside a system—and what it depends upon—becomes harder.

NIST’s commercial satellite cybersecurity guidance makes the broader point: commercial space is now part of an increasingly important infrastructure ecosystem, and cyber risk must be managed alongside the other risks inherent to operating in space. Commercialization, therefore, produces a paradox: The same technologies that make space faster, cheaper, and more accessible can also make the digital supply chain larger, more interconnected, and more difficult to fully understand.