Issue 157

Four Years of Change: Revisiting DIA’s Challenges to Security in Space

Four years after its last assessment, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has released the 2026 edition of Challenges to Security in Space, offering an updated assessment of how adversary space capabilities and the counterspace threat env

Four years after its last assessment, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has released the 2026 edition of Challenges to Security in Space, offering an updated assessment of how adversary space capabilities and the counterspace threat environment have evolved. The third in a series beginning in 2019, the latest report examines many of the same threats identified in its 2022 predecessor. However, the intervening four years have brought significant developments in the scale of space operations, the sophistication of counterspace capabilities, and the growing role of commercial space systems in military conflict.

China: Expanding Capabilities and Operations

China’s expanding space program was a central concern in DIA’s 2022 assessment, which documented Beijing’s investments in military space capabilities, satellite constellations, and counterspace weapons. The 2026 report illustrates the continued pace of that expansion. According to DIA, China conducted 93 space launches in 2025, compared with 22 in 2016, while the number of satellites deployed annually increased from 40 to 384 over the same period. Beijing has also continued launching satellites for its proliferated low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations, expanding its communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

One notable change in DIA’s public assessment concerns China’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. While the 2022 edition described Chinese satellite jamming systems and efforts to develop capabilities targeting synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and protected satellite communications, the 2026 report explicitly identifies both ground-based and on-orbit jamming systems among the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities. The assessment cites research examining Chinese military technical publications describing experimentation with an orbital jamming system as early as 2020. Although DIA does not identify specific operational spacecraft or provide details of their employment, the inclusion of on-orbit jamming represents a more explicit characterization of China’s counterspace capabilities.

China’s on-orbit activities also demonstrate advances in technologies with potential counterspace applications. In 2023, China’s TJS-3 spacecraft repeatedly approached within 10 kilometers of other nations’ satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). In January 2025, China launched Shijian-25, which Beijing claims will test orbital refueling and servicing capabilities. While these activities may serve legitimate purposes, the technologies involved could also support operations against other spacecraft. DIA further assesses that China may field space-based directed-energy systems and more powerful ground-based lasers by the late 2020s, potentially expanding its ability to threaten satellites in higher orbits.

2024 Image of China’s Shenlong Space Plane (DIA Challenges to Security In Space 2026)

Russia: Counterspace Capabilities in Conflict

DIA’s 2022 assessment highlighted Russia’s development of electronic warfare, directed-energy weapons, and kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities, including its November 2021 destructive ASAT test. Four years later, the 2026 report provides specific examples of Russian counterspace operations during the war in Ukraine, alongside concerns about potentially more destructive systems.

On February 24, 2022, immediately before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian malware targeted Viasat’s satellite communications network, disrupting service for approximately 50,000 users across Ukraine and other European countries.

Russian forces have also employed electronic warfare systems to interfere with satellite communications and navigation services, including GPS. DIA reports that Russia has targeted commercial satellite constellations supporting Ukrainian military operations with jammers, demonstrating how space-enabled services can be disrupted without physically destroying satellites.

The 2026 report also identifies Russia’s development of a satellite designed to carry a nuclear weapon, despite the prohibition on placing nuclear weapons in orbit under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. DIA assesses that such a capability could rapidly degrade or destroy thousands of satellites, disrupting communications, navigation, and other critical services. A nuclear detonation in space could also create radiation belts that persist for years, potentially damaging satellites that initially survived the event.

An Increasingly Complex Space Environment

Beyond individual Chinese and Russian capabilities, the two reports illustrate broader changes in the space environment. DIA’s 2022 assessment emphasized expanding commercial participation, increasing orbital congestion, and growing dependence on satellite services. The 2026 report places greater emphasis on the operational role of commercial space capabilities and their vulnerability during conflict.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the value of commercial satellite communications and imagery to military operations, while exposing those same services to electronic warfare and cyberattacks. DIA also identifies expanding space-related cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Since 2022, Russia has launched two remote-sensing satellites for Iran, while China has provided space-related components and services to Russia. These relationships demonstrate how international partnerships can support national space capabilities and potentially influence military operations.

The increasing availability of commercial space services further complicates the operating environment. Capabilities once largely limited to government programs are becoming accessible to a wider range of state and non-state actors, expanding both the benefits of space access and the potential threats to space-enabled services.

Looking Ahead

A comparison of DIA’s 2022 and 2026 assessments reveals a space threat environment shaped by the continued expansion of adversary capabilities, demonstrated counterspace operations, and the development of potentially more destructive weapons. China’s growing satellite fleets, DIA’s more explicit discussion of on-orbit electronic warfare, and Russia’s employment of counterspace capabilities in Ukraine illustrate different aspects of this evolution.

While many of the underlying threats were already identified in 2022, the developments documented in the latest report highlight the increasing complexity of protecting space systems and the services they provide. As military operations and commercial infrastructure become more dependent on space, the consequences of disrupting those systems will continue to extend well beyond the space domain.