Issue 156

Cyber Series Part 4 – Inside the Satellite: Cyber Threats to Spacecraft Subsystems

Satellites depend on more than ground stations and communications networks to operate. Once a command reaches a spacecraft, onboard computers and supporting systems must process the instructions and carry out the requested functions. These

Satellites depend on more than ground stations and communications networks to operate. Once a command reaches a spacecraft, onboard computers and supporting systems must process the instructions and carry out the requested functions. These systems control everything from spacecraft orientation and electrical power to communications and payload operations. A problem affecting one subsystem can interfere with others, even when the spacecraft remains otherwise functional.

Part 3 explored how cyberattacks on ground infrastructure can disrupt satellite services. Part 4 shifts the focus onboard, examining how unauthorized commands or compromised software could affect spacecraft subsystems and their operations.

Inside the Spacecraft

A satellite consists of multiple subsystems, that work together to support its mission, as illustrated in Figure 1. In many spacecraft, the Onboard Computer (OBC) serves as a central hub, processing commands, managing data, and coordinating communications among systems. Although space architectures vary, the OBC often performs key Command and Data Handling (C&DH) functions, while some rely on dedicated controllers. Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) functions support communications between the spacecraft and ground operators. Communications equipment receives commands and transmits telemetry, allowing operators to monitor spacecraft health and performance. (C&DH) processes and routes commands, manages onboard information, and supports communication among spacecraft components. Some spacecraft use centralized flight computers, while others distribute processing and control among several devices.

Figure 1: On-board Computer is the central hub that links all spacecraft functions together Linkedin

The Electrical Power System (EPS), Figure 2, generates, stores, and distributes electricity to onboard equipment. Attitude Determination and Control (ADCS) uses sensors and control mechanisms to determine and maintain the spacecraft's orientation. This is essential for pointing antennas toward ground stations, directing instruments toward targets, and positioning solar arrays. Thermal control maintains equipment within acceptable operating temperatures, while propulsion systems support orbital maneuvers and, on some spacecraft, attitude control.

Figure 2: Dragonfly Aerospace’s EPS-LP SatSearch

The payload performs the satellite's primary mission, whether that involves collecting imagery, providing communications, or conducting scientific observations. Unlike the supporting spacecraft bus, the payload's design and functions depend heavily on the mission.

These subsystems are closely related. Consider an Earth-observation satellite preparing to collect imagery. Its attitude control system must point the instrument toward the intended location, the power system must supply sufficient electricity, and onboard computers must manage the observation and store the collected data. A failure affecting any of these functions could interrupt the collection without necessarily disabling the imaging instrument.

The same relationships are relevant to cybersecurity. Access to a payload computer does not automatically provide control over propulsion or power systems. The consequences of unauthorized access depend on the spacecraft's internal architecture, the interfaces between components, and the authority assigned to the affected software or equipment.

When Software Access Changes Spacecraft Behavior

In 2023, the European Space Agency (ESA) supervised a cybersecurity demonstration involving OPS-SAT (Figure 3), an experimental satellite designed to test new technologies and operating procedures. Researchers from Thales Alenia Space uploaded software that introduced a vulnerability, which they later exploited to access a normally restricted spacecraft control layer.

After gaining access (Figure 4), the researchers demonstrated two effects. They replaced an image captured by the satellite’s camera and changed the spacecraft’s orientation, or attitude. The first affected the integrity of mission data, while the second demonstrated the ability to influence a physical spacecraft function.

Figure 3: OPS-SAT ESA

Figure 4: Testing OPS-SAT ESA

The experiment was conducted under controlled conditions. OPS-SAT was designed to accommodate experimental software, and the researchers had detailed knowledge of the spacecraft. Their approach was tested on a ground-based copy before being used in orbit. ESA supervised the activity and retained control throughout.

The experiment also demonstrated the importance of recovery. The activity was conducted entirely within the spacecraft's random-access memory (RAM). Following the test, ESA reset the affected memory and restored the satellite to a previously established safe software state. The spacecraft sustained no damage. OPS-SAT was not representative of every operational satellite. Its experimental architecture and the access granted to researchers were central to the demonstration. Nevertheless, the test showed that access to onboard software could affect both the information a satellite produces and its physical behavior.

Different Subsystems, Different Consequences

A cyber intrusion affecting one spacecraft subsystem may produce very different results from an intrusion affecting another. Interference with communications or TT&C functions could prevent operators from receiving telemetry or transmitting commands. Spacecraft rely on uplink communications to receive instructions from ground operators and downlink communications to return telemetry and mission data. For example, NASA's James Webb Telescope uses the Deep Space Network to receive commands and transmit spacecraft telemetry and scientific data, as illustrated in Figure 5. Interference with these communications could disrupt operations, while manipulation of onboard data could affect the accuracy of information returned to Earth. Neither outcome necessarily requires control over the spacecraft's orientation, propulsion, or other critical functions.

Figure 5: Communications between Webb Telescope and DSP, illustrating the uplink of commands and downlink of spacecraft telemetry and scientific data NASA/STScl

Attitude control presents a different concern. Satellites rely on precise orientation to maintain communications links, position solar arrays, and direct sensors toward their intended targets. Unauthorized changes to pointing commands or control settings could interrupt these activities if an attacker gained sufficient access. The OPS-SAT demonstration provided a controlled example of attitude manipulation, although it did not establish that the same technique would work against other spacecraft.

Figure 6: IAU architecture of TeamIndus lunar lander Medium

Power, thermal, and propulsion systems work together to support spacecraft operations. As shown in Figure 6 and 7, the TeamIndus lunar lander design uses an Integrated Avionics Unit (IAU) to coordinate these functions. Its power management module distributes electricity to onboard systems, thermal control uses sensor readings to regulate heaters, and propulsion control operates the spacecraft's engines and thrusters. Unauthorized changes to these functions could interrupt equipment, affect operating temperatures, or interfere with planned maneuvers. Such effects would require access to the relevant control systems and the ability to overcome existing safeguards.

Figure 7: Major functional components of the Integrated Avionics Unit of TeamIndus lunar lander Medium

The distinction between payload and spacecraft-bus functions is particularly important. Manipulating imagery or interrupting an observation may affect the reliability or availability of mission information while leaving the spacecraft operational. Interference with essential bus functions could have broader consequences because communications, power, and attitude control support multiple onboard activities.

These examples describe potential effects, not a record of successful attacks against every subsystem. The OPS-SAT experiment demonstrated specific capabilities under controlled conditions. Other outcomes depend on spacecraft design, the level of unauthorized access, and the protections separating onboard functions.

Why Onboard Security Is Different

Spacecraft present operational challenges that complicate cybersecurity. Unlike terrestrial systems, satellites generally cannot be brought into a maintenance facility for repairs. Operators must address software problems, equipment failures, and unexpected behavior through available communications links, sometimes with limited contact opportunities or significant communications delays.

Flight software also operates within the spacecraft's processing, memory, and power constraints. Updating it requires careful testing because an unsuccessful change could affect equipment needed to maintain communications or recover the spacecraft.

For these reasons, spacecraft incorporate mechanisms intended to detect faults and preserve essential functions. Depending on the design, these may include redundant equipment, watchdog timers, autonomous fault protection, and safe operating modes. Such mechanisms are primarily designed to address failures and operational anomalies, but they may also help limit the consequences of certain cyber incidents.

They do not replace cybersecurity controls. Command authentication and authorization, software integrity protections, and separation of critical functions remain important because fault-protection systems cannot be assumed to recognize malicious activity.

The OPS-SAT experiment illustrates both sides of this problem. Researchers were able to reach restricted software functions and alter spacecraft behavior, but ESA retained the ability to recover the satellite. The test demonstrated a potential avenue of interference without causing permanent damage.

A compromised payload, communications system, or flight-control function would not necessarily produce the same operational consequences. Evaluating a spacecraft cyber threat requires understanding what the affected subsystem does, which other functions depend on it, and what level of control an attacker would need to influence its operation.

A satellite's interconnected subsystems are essential to its mission, but they also create opportunities for cyber interference. Understanding how these systems operate helps identify where vulnerabilities could affect spacecraft performance.

Coming in Part 5 — Losing the Link: What happens when a satellite loses its connection to Earth? Next, we examine how cyber threats could disrupt spacecraft communications, interfere with command and control, and affect mission operations.